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The Fighter-Bomber in the
Normandy Campaign
The Role of 83 Group
Christopher Evans
ry-\le dichotomy between popular and academic
l. history is, for most historians, and readers,
an uncomfortable one. A book that appeals to a
mass audience risks the scorn of academia,
whereas a scholarly work may never reach
beyond the confines of the university. While there
are exceptions to this rule, John Keegan's The
Face of Battle being perhaps the most famous,
by and large academic study runs parallel with
popular accounts and rarely the twain meet. No
where is this more prevalent in the study of
military history than the question of the role
played by tactical air power in the Normandy
campaign. With over a half century of intense
study and voluminous publication this subject
continues to defy a comprehensive reconciliation.
It has therefore remained an area of constant
debate.
The Royal Air Force and Royal Canadian Air
Force, their proponents and certainly their pilots,
have argued that their contribution to the victory
in Normandy was vital, even decisive. Memoirs
abound filled with the bravado of heroic acts so
compelling that their tales have swept the day.
Frank Wootton's painting, "Rocket-firing
Typhoons at the Falaise Gap, Normandy, 1944,"
has come to epitomize this most positive view of
the tank-killing fighter-bomber. The commanding
officer of the Second Tactical Air Force, Air
Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, stated this
sentiment clearly in his postwar report on
operations. 1 George C. Blackburn, a gunner,
concurred with this view in his award-winning
book The Guns of Normandy:
Surely the Typhoon is proving to be the most
effective weapon of all in combating the
superiority of the enemy's armour, particularly

his irresistible Tigers. Without the Typhoons,
the Allies might never have subdued his
armoured divisions to the point where a breakout became possible. 2

Despite such overwhelming support for the
destructive powers of allied air power a group of
historians undertook the unenviable task of
questioning the myth of the tank-killing fighterbomber. W.A. Jacobs, Terry Copp and Robert
Vogel were among the first to publish studies
based on operational research reports.:;
Operational research involved the study of the
battlefield and the effectiveness, or lack thereof,
of the weapons employed. Data accumulated by
scientists of No.2 Operational Research Section,
combing the battlefields of Normandy, pointed
to something quite different than the pilots
were claiming. Panthers, Tigers, Mk. IVs and
assault guns certainly littered the Normandy
landscape. However, close examination
revealed that their demise was most often due
to ground fire, mechanical defect, destruction
by crew or lack of fuel. What then had tactical
air power achieved? If The Day of the Typhoon'
was more myth than reality, what was the
contribution made by the pilots risking and
often losing their lives in repeated ground
attacks? 4 Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, the
German general specifically tasked with repelling
the invasion forces, gave one possible answer:
Our own operations are rendered extraordinarily
difficult and in part impossible to carry out
[owing to] the exceptionally strong and, in some
respects overwhelming, superiority of the enemy
air force. The enemy has complete command of
the air over the battle zone and up to about 100
kilometres behind the front and cuts off by day
almost all traffic on roads. [-] Neither our flak
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nor the Luftwaffe seem capable of putting a
stop to this crippling and destructive operation
of the enemy's aircraft."

Shortly thereafter the Field Marshal was
seriously injured when his staff car was strafed,
at of all places, Ste. Fay de Montgommery. He
never took to the field of battle again. Allied
tactical air power was assured its place in
history.
A recent book on the subject, Air Power at
the Battlefront: Allied Close Air Support in
Europe. 1943-1945 by Ian Gooderson has
expanded on this perception. Far less satisfying
than the destruction of enemy tanks and far
harder to prove, Gooderson cites the creation of
negative morale as an important factor. Put
simply, even if the fighter-bomber did not destroy
the Tiger tank or knock out the concrete pill-box,
it could and often did terrify and throw into
confusion the soldiers within, thereby lessening
their ability to fight. A less palpable result
perhaps but a significant one nonetheless. But
is this new understanding of tactical air power,
based on contemporary studies, the whole story?
The answer is no.
The historiography regarding the
effectiveness of tactical air power in Normandy
has focused so tightly on one aspect, the provision
of close or direct support - attacking ground

targets on or near the battlefield - that it has
not fully encompassed the larger picture. All
can agree that the Second Tactical Air Force
was tasked with providing support to the
ground forces in Normandy. What must be first
clarified is how that support was actually
provided. Only then can an attempt at
quantifying its success be undertaken. The
degree to which close support operations
succeeded or failed becomes less crucial if the
evidence shows that missions of a defensive
and protective nature were the primary focus
of tactical air power operations in Normandy,
not close support.
With the end of the First World War the
concept of strategic bombing was to come to the
fore in Britain and remain there throughout the
interwar period. At a 1924 RAF Air Staff Planning
committee meeting it was made clear that the
development of dedicated attack aviation was
"quite unsuited to the needs of this country and
that it would be impossible to produce [-]without
starving far more important branches of the
RAF. "6 Said branches were those concerned with
the development oflong range strategic bombers
and short range defensive fighters. The design
and production of ground attack aircraft, with
their implied support of an army engaged in a
land campaign, was therefore ignored. By 1935
this attitude was firmly ingrained, so much so

A Canadian pilot poses in front qf his Hawker Typhoon.
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Ground crew prepare a Hawker Typhoonjor its next mission.

that the same committee concluded that "an
airforce whose primary function is direct
cooperation with the army in a large scale 'land
forces' war- [is] neither the role of the Royal Air
Force in war, nor in its 'imperial police' duties." 7
It therefore rejected "the idea of armouring
aircraft for use in the RAF" despite the likelihood
of"low flying attacks against ground targets in
the future. "8 Instead. existing aircraft would be
utilized if required.
In 1942 the RAF remained confident in the
ability of strategic bombing and continued to see
little need in pursuing closer ties with the army
in developing ground attack aircraft and doctrine.
The Air Staff stated that with:
the highest priority and sufficient energy I-I
devoted to the development of a coordinated day
and night bomber offensive - the war can
certainly be won in 1944. and possibly in 1943. 9

The army, however, did not see it this way. The
same year that the RAF were predicting an end
to the war through bombing, the British

Imperial General Staff circulated a paper calling
for no less than 109 squadrons to directly
support ground forces. The circular noted that
"Army Co-operation has been the Cinderella
branch of the RAF, and the Army's efforts to
get proper air support in reconnaissance,
bombing and fighter cover has never had a fair
deal. "10 When it was finally decided to create a
tactical air force to support land operations,
with the tacit acknowledgment by the RAF that
strategic bombing was not going to win the war,
it was too late to build an entirely new
organization and equipment. Tactical air power
would therefore have to come from existing
commands and aircraft, even though neither
were specifically designed for the task.
In the summer of 1943 the Second Tactical
Air Force was created in England. Among its key
components was 83 Composite Group. The
organization, especially 83 Group, was in reality
Fighter Command with a new name and new
mission. Since the successful defense of the
British Isles, Fighter Command had been in
23
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search of a new role. This situation was
exacerbated in the summer of 1941 when
virtually all Luftwaffe fighter and bomber
squadrons stationed in western Europe were
transferred to the new eastern front in Russia.
Fighter Command was in danger of becoming
redundant. Bomber Command had the range and
weapons to take the offensive to Germany, Fighter
Command did not. The Hurricane, already
obsolete in Europe, and its uncertain
replacement, the Typhoon and the updated
Spitfire, had all been designed for air defense.
As a result, they lacked the range to escort the
heavy bombers deep into occupied territory. The
compromise, as a way to utilize such a sizeable
asset, maintain morale and with the hope of
drawing some of the Luftwaffe squadrons away
from Russia, was to conduct offensive sweeps
over occupied France and the Low countries.
With the fighter squadrons now taking the
fight to the enemy, aspects of fighter aircraft
design, previously irrelevant, became critical.
Very quickly Air Vice Marshal Leigh-Mallory, AOCin-C Fighter Command concluded that "the best
type of aircraft for low flying attack was the radial
engined fighter. "11 This was disturbing. Fighter
Command possessed no such fighter. The only
new fighter added to the roster of what would
later become 83 Group was the ubiquitous
Mustang, another liquid cooled inline engined
fighter. Leigh-Mallory's remark stemmed from the
quite heavy losses that were incurring on these
offensive sweeps. All four fighter types had their
radiators and cooling systems located on the
bottom of the aircraft. While this offered
protection from an enemy airplane shooting from
behind, it presented ground fire, flak, with a very
vulnerable target. Prewar decisions to forego a
dedicated ground attack aircraft with sufficient
armour protection now took on a darker
connotation.
As offensive operations continued, other
problems began to emerge. Fighter pilots had not
been trained to drop bombs or fire rockets at
ground targets and their aircraft had not been
built to do so either. Studies concluded that
fighters equipped with bombs, flying at just 50
feet above the ground, would need to drop 60
bombs to hit a target 150 feet square, and this
with no enemy opposition. Raise the height to
a still low 1,000 feet, and the amount of flak to
moderate and the number of bombs required

jumped to a staggering 4,000. By the time
fighters were up at 10,000 feet and
experiencing intense flak the number of bombs
required was ridiculous; 50,000. 12 The desire
of the pilot to survive in the face of ground fire
and the unsuitability of fighters converted to
bombers proved anathema to accuracy.
The use of rockets was equally difficult. By
August 1943 the rocket projectile was regarded
as a weapon best used against large targets as it
was deemed not a "precision weapon." 13 This then
left strafing as the first and most accurate means
by which a fighter could attack ground targets.
Against soft targets such as transport and troops
in the open such attacks proved to be devastating.
However, the .303 and 20mm shells fired by the
fighters were virtually useless against tanks and
well fortified positions. In essence then, the most
accurate weapon fighters had with which to
conduct ground attack was also its weakest. This
was worrisome. The vaunted Panther and Tiger
tanks were viewed with varying states of awe and
fear by the men of the western armies who would
soon have to face them in numbers that in terms
of density surpassed those on the eastern front.
The army's hopes that the air force could deal
directly with these adversaries was to prove
illusory.

Air Superiority

'l '1 ]hen the allies came ashore in France on
VV 6 June 1944, the role of the supporting air
forces was deemed crucial. With the advantage
of hindsight the then very real chance of the allies
being pushed back into the sea seems of little
importance. To the leaders of the time however,
it remained an ominous possibility. Dieppe was
an all too graphic reminder of what could go
wrong. First and foremost then, the fighters of
the tactical air forces were tasked with gaining
and maintaining air superiority over the battle
area. It was a task they were supremely suited to
carry out.
Air Marshal Tedder commented after the
war that "even though one 'felt' the air situation
was satisfactory one must admit to a certain
degree of anxiety- it would have needed only a
small surviving enemy force to do immense
damage during the initial landings. "14 To negate
the German Air Force as much as possible the

24
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tactical air forces continued the offensive against
the Luftwaffe. Airfields and infrastructure were
attacked, escort patrols for bomber and fighterbomber formations were provided, defensive
patrols were conducted over the sea and land
forces and fighter sweeps behind enemy lines
continually sought out any German aircraft in
the sky. Their efforts proved extremely successful.
During the period 6 June through 30 June the
Luftwaffe sunk a mere five vessels and damaged
another seven. Over 5,000 ships were crowded
in the narrow confines of the English Channel
and Normandy beachhead yet the Luftwaffe
destroyed but a fraction of them. 15 It was at this
point, when allied armour and infantry were at
their most vulnerable, that the Luftwaffe could
have struck a severe, even crippling, blow. Its
failure to do so, as well as its inability to disrupt
the massive naval artillery that was brought to
bear on German targets far inshore with
devastating results, is an often-overlooked but
significant contribution that tactical air power
made to the land campaign.

Intelligence
he reconnaissance fighters of 83 Group
provided as great a service as those aircraft
directly attacking the enemy:

T

they kept a general watch on road and rail
movement and on shipping: they flew over rivers
to observe barge movement: bridging and
ferrying sites: they made detailed searches of
specific areas at the request of Twenty One Army
Group to detect possible concentrations for
counter- attacks. They also carried out
intelligence missions in search of gun-sites,
dumps, supply centres, etc .. and for purposes
of bomb damage assessment. 16

Table 1
Production of Air Photographs by 83 Group
during the Normandy Campaign 17

Month

No. of
No. of
Successful
Exposures
Sortes

No. of
Prints

June

446

34,000

287,000

July

299

33,000

380,000

August

495

76,000

814,000

Totals

1,240

143,000

1,481,000

Armed Reconnaissance and
Interdiction

I\ rmed reconnaissance meant that "fighter
.1""\aircraft [were] sent out to look for ground
targets and attack them. At the same time, pilots
bring back any possible information about the
enemy ground situation. " 19 Missions would
involve anywhere from 4 to 12 aircraft "sweeping
the given area at a height of about 4,000 to 6,000
feet, according to the flak concentrations present,
and searching for any form of road, rail or waterborne movement. "20 So numerous were these
missions that German road movement was
virtually confined to the hours after dark or in
bad weather when the marauding aircraft
would not be present.
Interdiction "was usually carried out in a
fairly calm period before the land battle really
joined, and consisted of cutting off completely
A photo-reconnaissance Mustang I of 430 Squadron
RCAF in Normandy.
CFPU PL 34965

A measure of just how active reconnaissance
aircraft were during the campaign is the sheer
volume of photographs taken in such a short
span of time [see Table 1]. These photographs
were distributed widely, often down to the platoon
level. providing the ground forces with up-to-date
information on enemy dispositions, thereby
allowing for a more informed plan of attack.
Information was to come from other sources too.
With fighter aircraft operating almost constantly
over forward enemy positions on other missions
they constantly reported back on what they saw,
supplementing the dedicated reconnaissance
squadrons many times over. 18
25
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A Typhoon of 438 Squadron RCAF being serviced. In the foreground are two
bombs ready to be fitted. a 1000-pounder (bottom) and a 500-pounder.

the area in which the enemy was situated by
carrying out bombing attacks on all lines of
communication leading to the area. "21 Armed
reconnaissance was an integral part of
interdiction and sought to starve the forward
German defences of food, fuel, ammunition and
reinforcements. The ability to quantify the
success of these missions however, remains
difficult. Postwar reports however, especially
those given by German generals, were vociferous
in noting the constant and destructive effect allied
air power had on their ability to conduct
operations:
Our daily losses in men and material from close
support planes and fighter bombers were high
in good weather. Their effect on the morale of
our soldiers was considerable. On the other
hand, the enemy suffered practically no losses
from our planes.
[-1 All our movements [-1 could, during clear
weather, only be accomplished during the night
(six to eight hours). During these few hours, we
experienced overloading of the road and railroad
network with resulting trafficjams. 22

The consequences of this were:
All our movements could be executed only
slowly, and with many difficulties and losses.
It was therefore necessary to plan in advance
and prepare those movements very thoroughly.
(l)

(2) The enemy was able to execute his
movements at least twice as fast as we carried
out ours.

(3) Movements of our units during daytime and
good weather bogged down because of air
attacks and caused heavy losses.
(4) The supply situation was bound to become
increasingly difficult.
(5) The moving up of reinforcements was a
tedious operation. Delays entailing critical
situations had to be taken into account. 2 "

Direct/ Close Air Support
~e

general term 'direct air support' was used
as a catch all to describe "the attack by air
forces of targets having an immediate effect upon
the action of our own land forces and may be
divided into prearranged and impromptu
support." 24 In either case this support was
primarily concerned with ground attack which
entailed strafing, bombing and I or rocketing of
specific targets near the front lines and in close
proximity to allied forces. For such missions
communication between the ground forces and
pilots was essential, and various methods were
employed. The one most famous was known as
"CABRANK" which consisted of a group of
orbiting aircraft being directed by a ground
controller onto a specific target.

J.

Despite its fame, CABRANK was never in
widespread use. It was a costly and difficult way
to employ aircraft and offered no guarantees of a
target being located. More often, when aircraft

26
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attacked targets near the front line, they adhered
to the bombline for guidance. As the name
suggests a line was delineated on the field of battle
that determined on which side an atrcraft could
safely engage targets. Geographic landmarks
were used to give pilots visual clues but this was
not always sufficient. In that case any number of
artificial indicators were employed to signal to
aircraft where the allied troops were in relation
to the Germans. These signals included strips of
cloth laid out on the ground, coloured smoke
or flares, trenches made with bulldozers or graters
and even white paint dtrectly on a road. 25 As the
ingenuity of the allied soldier was limited only by
what he could lay his hands on, the amount
and type of signal markers was numerous.
When the campaign evolved into one of
rapid movement. these methods were no longer
suitable and so another means of identification

was required. The front line would be 'predicted'
and pilots would be told to attack in areas that
the prediction indicated was enemy and not
allied. 26 Overly optimistic predictions would place
the Germans within the allied side, offering them
a greater degree of protection while a pessimistic
one could find allied troops further forward than
expected and so subject to attack by their own
aircraft. The system, while far from ideal, sufficed
in most cases.
The culmination of the Normandy campaign
was the "Battle of the Falaise Pocket." When the
"Pocket" was finally liquidated a rough tally was
made of the destroyed and abandoned vehicles
left in and around Falaise. There was so much
wreckage that the area was divided into three
portions, the Pocket. the Shambles and the
Chase. A total of 885 vehicles was counted in the
Pocket area, 3,043 in the Shambles and another

Reece photos qf the
German exodus in the
Falaise Pocket.
Right: At this
crossroads near
Orbec. clearly defined
traclc maries indicate
where vehicles on the
escape route make a
detour to pass
wrecked transport
blocking the road.
Below: Close paclced
German vehicles
(including cars. trucks.
AFVs and horse-drawn
carts) spotted by a
reconnaissance
aircrq[t east qf Falaise
on the hazardous
escape routes toward
the Seine River:
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3,648 in the Chase for a total of 7,576 vehicles,
not including the innumerable horse-drawn
carts, in this one section of Normandy aloneY
When the vehicles were categorized by type and
their condition assessed it became clear that
strafing, not bombs and rockets, had been the
main cause of destruction of vehicles attacked
from the air. Of the 150 tanks and self-propelled
guns located in the Chase, not a single one
showed signs of having been destroyed from
the air. 28 Even so, it is equally clear that at
least some of the German armour found was
there because of air attack on fuel trucks,
blocked roads and bridges and even the
demoralization of the crew.
In this final battle ofthe Normandy campaign
the pilots of 83 Group claimed the destruction
of 141 tanks and 2,284 motorized enemy
transport (MET). 29 While the evidence suggests
that these claims are exaggerated, the fact
remains that the battle ofthe Falaise Pocket was
a defeat comparable to that suffered by the
Germans at Stalingrad. In the span of just three
months two German armies had been mauled
and routed, and the air forces had played their

part. What has remained controversial ever since
was how exactly that contribution was made.
A breakdown of the numbers and types of
missions flown by the tactical air forces [shown
in Tables 2 and 3] is instructive in assessing their
contribution. Excluding the light and medium
bombers and focusing just on the fighter aircraft
one can see that for the first two months of the
campaign over 50 percent of all fighter sorties
were air superiority missions in some form.
When the month of August is included the total
drops to 42 percent, still far and away the single
largest number of sorties flown by the fighters in
the composite groups in 2nd TAF. The actual
percentage of missions termed direct or close
air support was just 19 percent of the total
effort expended. That bears repeating. Less
than 20 percent of all fighter and fighter I
bomber sorties flown throughout the entirety
of the Normandy campaign were of the specific
type, direct/ close support, that the army
wanted. The remaining 80 percent followed the
doctrine argued by the RAF, support through
air superiority, interdiction and intelligence
gathering.

Table 2
Effort expended on obtaining and maintaining Air Supremacy 30

Number of effective sorties flown by all groups
Month

Offensive
Patrols

Interception

Escort

Total

85 Group

83 and 84
Group

June

4,716

4,692

3,134

12,542

1,488

11,054

July

4,548

135

3,869

8,552

1,294

7,258

August

1,035

3,009

2,751

6,795

916

5,879

Totals

10,299

7,836

9,754

27,889

3,698

24,191

Table 3
Sorties by Aircraft of 2 TAF during the Normandy Campaign:11

Month

Medium &
Light
Bombing

Fighter
Escort &
Patrols

Fighter
Bomber&
RP attacks*

Armed
Reece

Photo,
weather
visual and
tactical
recce and
ASR

June

3,117

18,062

7,652

5,277

3,810

37,918

July

3,304

14,528

6,484

5,527

3,025

32,868

August

3,990

7,325

3,850

14,169

3,918

33,252

Totals

10,411

39,915

17,986

24,973

10,753

104,038

28

Total

*Rrifers to pre-arranged attacks against ground

targets and immediate support! close support.
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The importance of this finding cannot be
understated. The debate waged over the
effectiveness of the rocket Typhoons and their
accuracy and resultant impact on the battlefield
has focused entirely in the wrong area and on
the wrong criteria. To understand what tactical
air power did in the campaign requires that one
determine what the majority of sorties were and
what those sorties accomplished, either by what
they did, or what they prevented. It was the
fighter, in the case of 83 Group, the Spitfire and
the Mustang, not the fighter-bomber, the Typhoon,
that supplied the majority of the support to the
ground forces. It may have been in a form that
few soldiers ever saw or appreciated but
nonetheless benefitted from in very real and
tangible ways. [See Table 4].

Of the 403 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed
by pilots in 83 Group during the entire Normandy
campaign, not one was shot down by a Typhoon.
Despite being trained as fighter pilots first and
foremost, despite being equipped with single
engine fighter aircraft and despite operations in
a hostile environment for three months the
Typhoons of83 Group claimed no air-to-air kills
at ali.3 2 Spitfire and Mustang squadrons, often
flying right alongside them, did all the damage
to the Luftwaffe. This is as it should be. Typhoons
were tasked as fighter-bombers. with their focus
on the ground. The importance in this data is in
dispelling the notion of the duality of the fighterbomber. There were fighters and there were
bombers but rarely were they the same plane
and the same pilot on one sortie.

Table 4
Summary of 83 Group Operations Claims by Aircraft Type in the Normandy Campaign. June-August 1944
Month

Sorties

Bombs

R.P.

Tanks
Dest
Dam

MET
Dest
Dam

Enemy Aircraft
Dest
Prob
Dam

a/c

Losses
Pilots

3 Mustang III Squadrons
June
July
August
Totals

0

1.344

1.692

1.232

1.016

0

0

0

1.805

1.909

0

1

4

4.381

4.617

0

1

4

0

0

63

36

24

44

28

151

444

21

267

551

85

92

17

15

2

24

11

9

3

15

19

14

5

56

45

28

0

15

12 Spitfire Mk IX Squadrons
June
July
August
Totals

7.369

350

0

0

5

296

328

106

9

50

47

34

9.652

294

0

1

27

405

777

161

11

94

46

40

8.483

747

0

0

22

1.826

3.288

39

3

17

52

34

25.504

1.391

0

1

54

2.527

4.393

306

23

161

145

108

10 Typhoon 1B Squadrons RP and Bomb
June
July
August
Totals

3.458

2.029

11.830

17

8

141

52

0

0

0

31

23

3.094

2.290

15.351

39

61

60

70

0

0

0

28

22

4.703

3.415

19.264

215

179

1.227

1.386

0

0

1

55

48

11.255

7.734

46.445

271

248

1.428

1,508

0

0

1

114

93

4

3

2

2

3 Mustang I Squadrons Tactical Photo Reconnaissance
June
July
August

1.120

Totals

1.465

5

1.413

1

4

1

2

3

1

3.998

6

4

2

2

9

6

1

1 Composite Squadron Spitfire and Mosquito Strategic Photo Reconnaissance
June
July
August
Totals

139
144

1

248
531

1

Grand Totals for all83 Group Squadrons
June
July
August
Totals

13614

4071

11830

18

17

552

468

17643

2487

19349

49

97

516

936

143

1
/2

197

9

69

107

78

13

123

110

92

19012

7295

25181

268

344

3347

5329

63

6

35

140

104

50269

13853

56360

335

458

4415

6733

403 1/z

28

227

357

274

R.P. =rocket projectile: Dest=destroyed: Dam=damaged: MET=motorized enemy transport: Prob=probable: a/c=aircraft
(Compiled from 83 Group Intelligence Summaries IMW 83/ 15/3)
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Armourers prepare rocket projectiles for use on Typhoons at Aiifield B5
(121 Wing, 83 Group) near le Fresne-Camilly, Normandy.

The examination of results by squadron also
indicates the actual effort expended by the
various aircraft types in the fighter and fighterbomber role. Despite the efforts to equip Spitfires
with bombs, in the month of August 1944, 12
squadrons dropped just 7 4 7 bombs compared
with the 3,415 dropped by just 3 Typhoon
squadrons and the 1,909 dropped by 3 Mustang
squadrons.:1:1 The Spitfire dropped very few
bombs, fired no rockets yet claimed the highest
number of enemy vehicles destroyed of any
aircraft type in 83 Group. Even taking into
account the strong likelihood of inflated claims
it seems apparent that the cannon and machine
gun of the Spitfire proved the most effective in
ground attack, in other words strafing. As has
been shown, the wing mounted cannon and
machine gun in the single engine fighter were the

most accurate weapon system on the aircraft and
the only weapon the aircraft had initially been
designed to carry. The focus on German armour,
and the attempts to destroy it, proved far less
successfuL
The importance of tactical air power and
the way to garner a true appreciation of what
it accomplished lies in understanding its role,
and how it carried that role out. The single
engine fighters of 83 Group were engaged
primarily in gaining and then maintaining a
degree of air superiority over the battlefield that
would, and did, allow the allies almost total
freedom to deploy and conduct operations
unhindered by the Luftwaffe. In this, tactical
air power was clearly successfuL
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The question of the effectiveness of close air
support is not as easily answered. The number
of German armoured fighting vehicles destroyed
by tank-bustingTyphoons is demonstrably low.
The number of German soldiers and tank
crewmen who ran or cowered after an attack,
thereby easing the job of the allied soldier, is
unknown and will remain so. The bitter struggle
that German forces conducted throughout the
entire campaign however, does suggest that
whatever the morale effect was, it proved
insufficient in most cases to carry the day. In the
end, it was allied infantry, armour and artillery,
under a mostly benign sky, that would
accomplish that.
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The debate on the effectiveness of allied
tactical air power in the Normandy campaign '-"ill
continue. To bridge the continuing divide between
what is "popular" and what is "scholarly," eyewitness and documentary evidence, from all
sources. be they pilots, soldiers, or scientists.
allied or enemy. would appear to offer hope of a
synthesis of ideas.

16.
17.
18.

19.

20.

Notes

1.

2.

3.

4.

Operations Carried out by Second Tactical Air Force
Between 6th June 1944 and 9th May 1945 by Air
Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham. November 1945. pp.
10-12. Public Record Office [PRO] AIR 371876.
George C. Blackburn. The Guns of Normandy: A
Soldier's Eye View. France. 1944 (Toronto. McClelland
& Slewat·t. 1995). p.350.
See W.A. Jacobs. "The Batlle for France·· in Case
Studies in t.he Development Q/' Close Air Support edited
by B. F. Cooling (Washington. DC. Office of Air Force
History. 1990): Terry Copp and Robert Vogel, "AngloCanadian Tactical Air Power in Normandy: A
Reassessment." 1987 presentation at the American
Military Institute: Terry Copp. "Tactical Air Power in
Northwest Europe 1944-45: The Evidence from
Operational Research." 1987. unpublished paper:
Robert Vogel. "Tactical Air Power in Normandy: Some
Thoughts on the Interdiction Plan." Canadian Military
History. Vol.3. No.1 (Spring 1994). pp.37-47.
The phrase refers to the destruction of the German
armoured attack at Mortain on 7 August 1944. in which
rocket-firing Typhoons have been credited with the
victory. See John Colley's The Day qf the Typhoon:
Flying wil.h the RAF Tanlcbust.ers in Normandy
(London: Longman. 1975).

5.

6.

Message from Rommel to Field Marshal Keitel. 12
June 1944. reproduced from John Terraine. Right Q/'
the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War,
1939·1945 (New York: Macmillan Publishing
Company. 1985). p.637.
Minutes of Air Ministry Planning Committee. 28
February 1935. p.l. PRO AIR 9 I 6.

"Relative Bombing Efficiency - Actual Results to be
Expected Through Improved Strategy. Tactics and
Equipment.•· Air Staff. 14 October 1942. p. 7. PRO AIR
2013360.
Reproduced from ChiE:FQ/'Sta[[. Brian Bond. eel., 1974,
pp.l9-20.
Minutes of Meeting held by Commander-in-Chief Home
Forces at GHQ to discuss Army Air Support. 11 May
1943. PRO WO 2051567.
Report on the Army Requirement for Direct Support
in Battle. 30 November 1942, Appendix A, p.19. PRO
AIR37/760.
"Fighter Attack on Locomotives." D. Arm. D. Trial
Interim Report. Appendix C. 1 August I 943. PRO AIR
16/705.
Arthur Tedder. Air Power in War (London: Hodder and
Stoughton, 1948). p.35.
L.F. Ellis, Victory in the West. Volume One (London:
HMSO. 1962). p.295.
Air Historical Branch. The Liberation QF North West
Europe, Vol.III, Chapter 3, p 14(a). PRO AIR 41124.
Army Operations Research Group Memo AS. Appendix
D. PRO WO 291 I 1178.
Chief of the Imperial General Staff and Chief of the Air
Staff. "Army I Air Operations Pamphlet No.2 ... April
1944, p 17. Department of National Defence. Canada.
Directorate of History and Heritage IDHHJ 941142.
ORS 2nd TAF Report No.30. July 1945. "Armed
Reconnaissance bv Aircraft of 2nd TAF in the Western
European Campaign." PRO WO 291 I 1357.
Air Historical Branch. "Tactics Used by Squadrons of
the 2nd TAF during the Campaign in Western Europe,"
Part III. May 1951. p.2. PRO AIR 37 I 835.

21. Ibid.
22. Report on the Fighting of Panzergruppe West (Fifth
Panzer Army) from July 3-9 August 1944 by General
Heinz Eberbach. Commanding Officer. June 1948.
National Archives (US) Microfiche Publication M1035.
Foreign Military Studies, B Series (RG 338). pp.12-13.
23. Ibid. p.l3.
24. Army Air Training Instruction No.1. 1943. Army Air
Operations. p.6. Air 81988.
25. Army Air Operations Pamphlet No.2. p.37. DHH 941
142.
26. Jacobs. p.267.
27. No.2 Operational Research Section Report No.15,
"Enemy Casualties in Vehicles and Equipment during
the Retreat from Normandy to the Seine." contained in
Terry Copp, eel. Operational Research in 21 Army
Group (Waterloo: LCMSDS. forthcoming 1999).
28. Ibid. Appendix H.
29. 83 Group Intelligence Summaries. August 1944.
Imperial War Museum. 83115/3.
30. 2TAFIORS Report No.30, July 1945. PRO WO 291/
1357.
31. Ibicl.
32. 83 Group Intelligence Summaries. IWM 8311513.
33. Ibid.

Christopher Evans has an MAin history from
Wilfrid Laurier University. He was the
historian on a recently-televised documentary
on Vimy Ridge. He is currently writing his
first book, a study of the effectiveness and
role of tactical air power in Normandy.
31

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1999

11

Canadian Military History, Vol. 8 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 3

CMH Mailbox- continued from p.6.
knowing that they were out of normal
small arms range I ordered my
platoon Browning machine gun to
open fire. This it did with shattering
effect on the quiet evening air and on
our own protective barbed wire.
I do not know what effect this fire
had on the enemy but it had an
almost immediate effect on me.
Within seconds I was summoned to
a violently ringing phone to answer
demands from what seemed everyone
from the GOC down as to why, and
on whose authority, my MMG had
fired. When I lamely replied that I
thought the purpose of that gun was
to shoot the enemy I received a short
but blistering lesson on the special
nature of war in Korea:
- "Don't fire your MMG unless your
own position is under attack." To
which my unvoiced reply was that I
thought that the primary role of that
gun was to fire in support of others.
-"Don't fire your MMG except in an
emergency or you'll give away your
position." Fair enough except that
when patrolling in the valley you can
identify nearly every UN position and
few of the enemy's.
-"Report all activity. unless directed
against you, before you engage." To
which my rueful, but unspoken, reply

was " I wish I had done so in this
case by which time the enemy would
have disappeared and I'd have been
spared all these rockets."
On another time and place one of
my platoon's three-man night
standing patrols had relocated its
valley position after being sited. Since,
in the interest of wireless silence, they
were equipped with a field telephone
this relocation stretched the
telephone line back to platoon. A
Chinese patrol which was covering a
propagnda sign planting party
bumped into the wire and followed it
to where our patrol lay hidden. The
Canadians fired, at least one Chinese
fell and our patrol dispersed. The
enemy artillery commenced a heavy
bombardment of our hill.
I reported the loss of contact and
was about to lead my Quick Reaction
party (the three trench clearers but
armed with Brens and Stens instead
of grenades) down on a search when
I was summoned back to company
headquarters to be briefed on a
fighting patrol sweep I would now
lead instead. The night was pitch
black, company HQ was some 200
yards back and the Chinese were still
shelling so the whole thing took a long
time. By the time I had been briefed,
reviewed a hasty fire plan, returned
and briefed the fighting patrol and
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started off at least an hour had been
lost and the Cbinese had flown the
coop.
On tbe plus side we swept the
valley until daybreak and brought
back our missing standing patrol
members. On the negative side the
long time delay in changing plans and
teeing up a formal patrol resulted in
a ponderous. overly controlled, slow
operation when only a lightning
reaction bad a chance of real success.
As was often proven in the First World
War. a small two or three man ligbtly
armed snatch patrol usually achieved
greater success than did a formal raid
involving a platoon or more. It was a
lesson usually forgotten in the Second
World War. except by commandos.
and almost ignored in Korea.
I should empbasize that none of
this is in any way a criticism of my
company commander or battalion
CO. Both were first class officers. It
was simply the nature of semi-static
trench warfare where the smallest
warlike action
resulted
in
intervention and over control from
above derived from concepts of
command honed at Verrieres and the
Hochwald.
Yours faithfully,
A.D. McKay
Stittsville ON
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